

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0071

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC,
FEBRUARY 28

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

AD HOC GROUP ON FEB 27 APPROVED FOLLOWING TEXT, DEALING
WITH NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS INTRODUCED DURING FEB 25
INFORMAL SESSION (SEE MBFR VIENNA 0068), FOR USE BY
CANADIAN REP (GRADE) IN MAKING AD HOC GROUP REPORT
TO NAC ON FEB 28. TEXT WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO
GRANDE'S ORAL REPORT, OUTLINE OF WHICH IS TRANSMITTED
BY SEPTTEL (NOTAL). AD HOC GROUP ALSO APPROVED
CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS BELOW WHICH GRANDE WILL DRAW ON
AS NEEDED, FOLLOWING HIS REPORT, IF MORE DETAILED
DISCUSSION DEVELOPS IN THE NAC ON THE NEW EASTERN
PROPOSALS. BEGIN FYI: CONTINGENCY RESPONSE #3

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FORMS THE BASIS OF THE TALKING POINTS WE WOULD EXPECT

TO USE DURING THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ON MARCH 4.
WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND
UNDESIRABLE FOR THE NAC TO DEVELOP NEW GUIDANCE ON THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS OF FEB 25. IN OUR VIEW, AND
IN THE VIEW OF THE AD HOC GROUP, EXISTING NAC
GUIDANCE IS FULLY ADEQUATE. DELAY IN RESPONDING TO
THE EAST WOULD LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
WERE GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS.
MOREOVER, VARIOUS EASTERN DELEGATION MEMBERS HAVE, HOWEVER,
ALREADY INDICATED TO US INFORMALLY THAT THEY THEMSELVES
DO NOT EXPECT THEIR NEW PROPOSALS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.
END FYI.

BEGIN TEXT:

SECTION FOR INCLUSION IN REPORT TO NAC

1. IN THE FEBRUARY 25 INFORMAL SESSION, THE EAST PROPOSED
CERTAIN PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS IN ITS EARLIER REDUCTION
PROPOSALS. THESE MODIFICATIONS WERE PRESENTED AS FURTHER
COMPROMISE PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT.
2. IN THIS SESSION, KHLESTOV SAID THE EAST WAS READY
TO AMEND THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT
OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, IN ORDER TO INCORPORATE IN IT ALL
FEATURES OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL
OF OCTOBER 15, 1974. THE EAST WAS ALSO READY TO DISCUSS
THAT INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL AS A SEPARATE MEASURE.
KHLESTOV SAID INCORPORATING THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP
PROPOSAL INTO THE ORIGINAL EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WOULD
DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS INITIAL STEP WAS NOT A SUBSTITUTE
FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS BUT AN INTEGRAL PART OF A
PROGRAM ENVISAGING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.
3. KHLESTOV ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973 COULD BE
AMENDED SO THAT IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SAME STAGED
WAY AS THE EAST HAD PROPOSED FOR ITS INITIAL REDUCTION
STEP PROPOSAL. SPECIFICALLY, IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE USSR WOULD EACH REDUCE 5 PERCENT

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OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1976. ALL
REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE FIVE PERCENT
OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1976.

4. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS CONSIDER THESE EASTERN PRO-
CEDURAL PROPOSALS TO BE OF SUCH LIMITED SCOPE THAT WE
SHOULD INFORM THE EAST PROMPTLY THAT, AS THEIR PROPOSALS
HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO US THUS FAR, THEY DO NOT INVOLVE

CHANGES OF SUBSTANCE, AND THAT THE TALKS SHOULD RETURN TO A FOCUS ON PRACTICAL ISSUES LIKE DATA EXCHANGE.

5. ACCORDINGLY, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS INTEND TO RESPOND TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IN THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ALONG THE LINES THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE OF LIMITED NATURE AND DO NOT AFFECT THE ESSENTIAL CONTENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION, WHICH CONSISTS OF THE CONTINUED EFFORT TO GAIN WESTERN ACCEPTANCE THAT THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONTRACTUALIZED IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

CONTINGENCY PAPER FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH REPORT TO NAC - EASTERN PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY 25

1. POSSIBLE QUESTION:

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE NAC MAY ASK FOR THE AD HOC GROUP'S ASSESSMENT OF EASTERN MOTIVES IN INTRODUCING THEIR NEW PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY 25.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE:

AS THE AD HOC GROUP SEES IT, THE MOST LIKELY EASTERN MOTIVATION FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS TO CREATE THE ILLUSION OF MOVEMENT WITHOUT CHANGING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EASTERN POSITION. (IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST IS MOVING TOWARD A POSITION WHERE IT WILL OFFER THE WEST THE CHOICE BETWEEN A SMALL SYMBOLIC FIRST REDUCTION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BASED EITHER ON EQUAL NUMBERS OR ON EQUAL PERCENTAGES. SUCH A MOVE WOULD ALSO BE PURELY TACTICAL AND WOULD NOT CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EASTERN POSITION.)

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2. POSSIBLE QUESTION:

THERE MIGHT BE SOME SUGGESTION THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER AT BRUSSELS BEFORE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS GIVE A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE:

A. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS CAN OF COURSE BE STUDIED. HOWEVER, AS VIEWED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT WORTH TAKING SERIOUSLY. THEY APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED TO CREATE AN ILLUSION OF EASTERN FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT IN ANY WAY CHANGING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EASTERN POSITION. THEY DO NOTHING TO REMEDY THE BASIC DEFECTS OF THE EASTERN APPROACH AS OUTLINED IN THE BELGIAN REP'S

STATEMENT OF NOV 14, 1974.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

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B. ALLIED VIEWS ON THE ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE INVOLVED IN THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE WELL DEVELOPED AND HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY ARTICULATED BY THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN THE TALKS. TO HESITATE IN IDENTIFYING THE UNDERLYING CONTINUITY IN THE EASTERN POSITION MIGHT GIVE THE EAST THE WRONG IMPRESSION AND ENCOURAGE THE EAST TO PERSIST WITH THESE TACTICAL VARIANTS INSTEAD OF SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING ITSELF TO THE ALLIED POSITION. THE AD HOC GROUP BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE NOT TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND INDICATE IN CLEAR TERMS TO THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THEIR INSUBSTANTIAL NATURE. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD RISK LEAVING THE FLOOR TO THE EAST.

3. POSSIBLE QUESTION:

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES MAY ASK FOR MORE DETAILS
OF ALLIED ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS.

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SUGGESTED RESPONSE:

A. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE
OF LIMITED PROCEDURAL NATURE AND DO NOT AFFECT THE ESSENTIAL
CONTENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION, WHICH CONSISTS OF THE
CONTINUED EFFORT TO GAIN WESTERN ACCEPTANCE THAT THE GROUND
FORCE DISPARITY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE
CONTRACTUALIZED IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

B. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY REJECTED THE INITIAL
REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL, MAINLY FOR THE REASON JUST CITED.
INCORPORATING IT IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF
NOVEMBER 1973, WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE ALSO REJECTED, DOES
NOT MAKE THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL ANY MORE
ACCEPTABLE.

C. THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
NOVEMBER 1973 WARSAW PACT DRAFT AGREEMENT BE IMPLEMENTED
IN TWO STAGES, WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES REDUCING FIRST,
DOES NOT IN ANY WAY ALTER THE FACT THAT THIS STAGE IS
BASED ON REDUCING THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE AND THEREFORE ALSO AIMS AT CON-
TRACTUALIZING THE IMBALANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

D. HOWEVER, IF THE EAST WERE WILLING TO APPLY THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS TO A SUBSTANTIAL
FIRST REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ALONE, THIS
WOULD REPRESENT A STEP FORWARD).

E. AS REGARDS PHASING, THE EAST IS CONTINUING TO
ADHERE TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
MUST UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THE AMOUNT
AND TIMING OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY
REDUCTIONS CAN TAKE PLACE.

F. THE EAST PROPOSES THAT, AFTER ALL PARTICIPANTS
HAVE AGREED ON THE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS AND TIMING OF THEIR
REDUCTIONS, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN IMPLEMENT
THEIR AGREED REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF A GIVEN

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YEAR AND THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CAN IMPLEMENT THEIR PREVIOUSLY AGREED REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND SIX MONTHS OF THAT YEAR.

G. THIS IS, AS THE EAST ITSELF STATES, MERELY A MODIFICATION IN THE PROCEDURES OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE EAST HAS MADE NO MOVE TO MEET JUSTIFIED WESTERN REQUIREMENTS THAT THE EAST AGREE TO A SUBSTANTIAL FIRST PHASE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE EAST AGREE THAT THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS SHOULD BE A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES, AS NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS TO SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

H. IN SUM, THE EASTERN SUGGESTIONS OF FEBRUARY 25 DO NOT INVOLVE ANY CHANGES OF SUBSTANCE IN THE EASTERN POSITION. WESTERN VIEWS ON THIS POSITION HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE EAST IN DETAIL. IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE FOR THE TALKS TO RETURN TO A FOCUS ON PRACTICAL ISSUES LIKE DATA EXCHANGE.

4. POSSIBLE QUESTION:

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES MAY ASK WHETHER THE ALLIES WOULD INTEND TO MAKE FURTHER POINTS TO THE EAST OTHER THAN THAT IN POINT 5 ON THE COMPANION PAPER.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE:

REPLY ALONG THE LINES OF THE POINTS CONTAINED UNDER QUESTION 3 ABOVE.

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